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TWO-WAY CAUSALITY BETWEEN
INSURANCE AND LIABILITY
JOAN T. SCHMIT*
KATHERINE L. PHELPS**
I. INTRODUCTION
Two-way causality is a term used to describe certain eco-
nomic relationships. Two-way causality relationships exist
when a predictive variable is dependent on the variable of pre-
diction.1 Where two-way causality is found in economics, ap-
plication of particular statistical techniques is required to
specify the relationship.2
The relationship between insurance availability and liabil-
ity determination demonstrates the two-way causality phe-
nomenon. This assertion rests on the observation that
determination of liability, often predicated on the availability
of insurance,3 develops a need for insurance.4 Thus, liability is
* B.S., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1978; M.B.A., University of Wisconsin,
Madison, 1979; Ph.D., Indiana University, 1984; Assistant Professor of Insurance, Uni-
versity of South Carolina.
** B.S., Francis Marion College, 1982; Ph.D. Candidate in Finance/Banking, Uni-
versity of South Carolina.
1. The classic example of two-way causality is in the definition of demand as a
function of price. It is a two-way relationship because price, in turn, is a function of
demand. That is, price (P) is a function of demand: P = f(D); and demand (D) is a
function of price; D = g(P). See generally H. THEIL, PRINcn PLEs OF ECONOMETRiCS
(1971).
2. One popular method of dealing with two-way causality in economics is through
employment of simultaneous equations. Thus, price and demand, for example, are de-
termined simultaneously: P = f(g(P)).
3. See, e.g., Galante, Calif. Court Says Insurers Have No Duty in Sex Suits, Nat'l
L.J., Oct. 15, 1984, at 6. The article implies that a court's refusal to require a home-
owner's insurer to defend an insured in a sexual molestation case (because the act was
intentional and, thus excluded from coverage) would make recovery in such suits diffi-
cult for other plaintiffs. In essence, the implication is that lack of insurance reduces the
likelihood of liability.
4. For example, one author reported the following:
The cloak ofjudicial immunity is unraveling further as the result of a recent
Supreme Court decision that increases judges' exposure to liability for their ac-
tions from the bench.
As a result, risk managers for public entities with judges in their jurisdiction
have a new liability exposure and may need to seek additional insurance for them.
Fletcher, Ruling Unravels Judges' Cloak of Immunity, Bus. INS., Aug. 13, 1984, at 3
(emphasis supplied).
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a function of insurance and insurance a function of liability.
Unlike the economic relationship, however, two-way causality
between liability and insurance is not merely a problem of sta-
tistical specification; it is a problem that alters relationships in
a fashion the authors consider undesirable. Therefore, the
purpose of this article is to illustrate causality between insur-
ance and liability, analyze the resulting benefits and detri-
ments of causality to a system of compensation, and propose
means of minimizing the detriments while promoting the
benefits.
In Section II, documentation is provided of the role played
by insurance in a number of legal contexts, particularly those
contexts traditionally dominated by immunity, in order to il-
lustrate the causality relationship between insurance and lia-
bility. Consequences of two-way causality are highlighted in
Section III. The analysis is completed in Section IV with a
summary of the research and conclusions drawn therefrom.
II. DOCUMENTATION OF TwO-WAY CAUSALITY
A. General
To test the hypothesis that two-way causality exists be-
tween insurance and liability, the authors researched the his-
torical abrogation of various types of immunity. Immunity
has been justified, at least in part, on the argument that it pro-
tects against depletion of certain funds.6 The availability of
insurance weakens this argument. Thus, where immunity is
abrogated because of the availability of insurance, the two-
way causality phenomenon is demonstrated.7 Immunities of
governments, of charitable organizations, and between family
5. The authors do not intend to assert, however, that use of liability insurance for
compensation, as opposed to first-party coverage such as health insurance, is wasteful.
See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Ass'n, 96 N.E. 1089 (Ohio 1911), in which
the Ohio Supreme Court held that the defendant hospital's status as a charitable institu-
tion entitled it to immunity from tort liability stating, "[t]he funds intrusted to it are not
to be diminished by such casualties. ... Id. at 1091. See also Morehouse College v.
Russell, 109 Ga. App. 301, 136 S.E.2d 179 (1964).
7. The purpose of this article is to illustrate two-way causality between insurance
and liability. Its purpose is not to discuss the abrogation of immunity. Hence, no at-
tempt is made to present legal histories of abrogation. For discussion of such legal
histories and the policies underlying abrogation of immunity, see generally W. PROSSER
& W. P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 122, 131 (5th ed. 1984).
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members were considered. The development of liability in
products and medical malpractice cases in the context of two-
way causality was also considered.
Of the liabilities examined, greatest emphasis is given to
liability resulting from the abrogation of intrafamilial immu-
nity. Several reasons for such focus can be offered. First, in-
trafamilial liability is the area most developed of the three
abrogated immunities studied.8 Second, the importance of in-
surance is clearly outlined in the pertinent case histories.9
Third, ramifications of abrogating intrafamilial immunity ap-
pear less extensive and worrisome than those related to abro-
gation of sovereign immunity or charitable immunity. The
acts between family members directly affect each other and
perhaps a few others. By contrast, acts of municipalities and
charitable organizations have direct implications for a great
many people. Yet, similarities exist because families have
been considered quasi-governmental units.10 Thus, the ad-
vancement of family liability could be considered a forerunner
of liability in other areas of traditional immunity. If in-
trafamilial liability is indeed a forerunner, the continued abro-
gation of governmental and charitable immunity can be
expected. The theory of two-way causality itself indicates that
abrogation will continue because insurance eliminates some of
the justifications for immunity.1 Thus, intrafamilial liability
is presented first so that parallels may be extended to the other
immunity areas.
8. Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 788 n.l (Iowa 1981), listed 27 states to pre-
cede Iowa in abrogating parental immunity, at least for actions outside the area of pa-
rental authority and discretion. Thus, liability appears to have become the majority
rule. See also Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1066 (1981) (dealing with the question of parental
liability for injury to an unemancipated child caused by a parent's negligence).
9. For a survey discussion of the cases relevant to this issue, see 8 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 273, 280 (1982) ("The prevalence of homeowner's and renter's liability insur-
ance is a factor in favor of the adoption of the reasonable parent standard").
10. See, e.g., Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Iowa 1968) (parental immu-
nity is supported because "the family acts as a quasi-governmental unit").
11. Courts often state that immunity is the exception rather than the rule. Hence,
as public policy reasons for immunity are shown to be nonexistent or immaterial, liabil-
ity will rule. See, e.g., Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962).
"[The general rule is and should be that, in the absence of statute or some compelling
reason of public policy, where there is negligence proximately causing an injury, there
should be liability. Immunity exists only by statute or by reason . . . of public pol-
icy." Id. at -, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 101, 376 P.2d at 69.
1985]
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B. Intrafamilial Liability
Various relationships between family members tradition-
ally have been immune to liability for negligence. Justification
for the immunity has been based on the following factors: 1)
immunity promotes family harmony, 2) parental care, disci-
pline, and control are maintained through immunity, 3) the
family exchequer remains intact where immunity exists, 4) im-
munity discourages fraud and collusion.1 2
1. Interspousal Immunity.
Immunity between spouses was founded on rules of com-
mon law.13 These rules eliminated the individual legal identi-
ties of wives, thereby denying them property rights. Thus, a
suit between spouses actually constituted a suit between the
same legal entity. The Married Women's Acts, 14 legislation
that gave wives the right to own property and to have identi-
ties separate from their husbands, preempted the common law
rules. Suits between spouses consequently constituted claims
between the separate legal entities. As a result, the bulwark to
liability was shattered.' 5 Furthermore, the existence of liabil-
ity insurance made other justifications for immunity
irrelevant. 16
12. See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 11 (Alaska 1967).
13. See, e.g., Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970). "At common law,
a husband and wife were regarded as one, the legal assistance of the wife being merged
with that of the husband. Thus, one spouse was precluded from maintaining an action
against the other at law or equity for wrongful conduct whether intentional or negli-
gent." Id. at _, 267 A.2d at 482.
For a discussion of interspousal immunity, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 83, at 554 (4th ed. 1971).
14. Married Women's Acts were typically adopted throughout the United States in
order to eliminate civil inequities in the status of married women. See Paiewonsky v.
Paiewonsky, 446 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1971). Typical of these acts are: COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-2-201 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-4 (1953). See also McCurdy, Torts Be-
tween Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030 (1930).
15. For example, C. GREGORY, H. KALVERN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATER-
IALS ON TORTS 747 (3d ed. 1977), states: "The recognition of the wife's individual sta-
tus could well have been sufficient to remove the original objection to suits between
spouses, based as it was on the fictional entity."
16. "The presence of insurance militates against the possibility that the interspousal
relationship will be disrupted since a recovery will in most cases be paid by the insur-
ance carrier rather than by the defendant spouse." Immer, 56 N.J. at -, 267 A.2d at
484-85.
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2. Immunity Between Children and Parents.
Like interspousal immunity, immunity between children
and parents is based on common law.17 Unlike interspousal
immunity, however, abrogation of immunity between children
and parents is not based on passage of governing laws.
Rather, the impact of insurance availability has dominated the
abrogation of immunity between parents and children.1" In
particular, the prominence of insurance significantly weakens
the argument that liability would destroy the family excheq-
uer.19 Insurance also promotes equitable treatment between
family members and unrelated parties, thereby encouraging
family harmony2° rather than family discord.
The evolution of the insurance argument in parent versus
child suits provides a clear indication of the two-way causality
relationship between insurance and liability. Goller v. White21
is often cited as the pathbreaking case in parental liability.
The court in Goller held that:
the mere fact that the particular defendant-parent is pro-
tected by liability insurance does not enable his minor child
to maintain an action when, in the absence of such insur-
ance, he could not otherwise maintain it .... Nevertheless,
we consider the wide prevalence of liability insurance in per-
17. Parental immunity apparently emerged from the Mississippi Supreme Court's
decision in Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). For a discussion, see
Hebel, 435 P.2d at 9-11.
18. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), was the seminal case
abrogating parental immunity with respect to non-disciplinary activities. The court
suggests that wide prevalence of insurance is a consideration in determining whether or
not immunity should continue. Id. at 412, 122 N.W.2d at 197. Unlike wives, who held
no individual identity, children carried separate legal personalities from their parents.
Immunity for children was based on the justifications given in Hebel, not on fictional
unity. The availability of insurance weakens these justifications, leaving little reason for
immunity.
19. The court in Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982), citing many other cases,
noted that "[w]hen recovery is allowed from an insurance policy the claimant will not
force a depletion of the family assets at the expense of the other family members." Id.
at 1068-69.
20. The court stated in Hebel:
It appears to us illogical to sanction property actions between unemancipated
minors and their children; to allow an action if the child happens to be emanci-
pated; to permit an action if the parent inflicts intentional harm upon the child
.; but on the other hand, to deny the unemancipated child redress for his
personal njuries when caused by the negligence of a living parent.
Hebel, 435 P.2d at 15.
21. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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sonal injury actions a proper element to be considered in
making the policy decision of whether to abrogate parental
immunity in negligence actions. . .. [T]he existence of in-
surance tends to negate any possible disruption of family
harmony and discipline.22
When the Goller holding is compared with that of Ard v.
Ard13 the expansion of the insurance argument is noticeable.
The Ard court stated:
When recovery is allowed from an insurance policy the
claimant will not force a depletion of the family assets at the
expense of the other family members. As stated in Sorensen,
rather than a source of disharmony, the action is more likely
to ease the financial difficulties stemming from the injuries.24
The Goller court considered the availability of insurance a
counter to arguments favoring immunity. The Ard court, by
contrast, considered the use of insurance a desirable end in
and of itself. Ard went beyond mere rejection of arguments
for immunity; it used insurance as a justification for imposing
liability.25 Thus, the availability of insurance not only abro-
gated parental immunity, it has been used to create liability
where otherwise there might have been none.26
22. Id. at 412, 122 N.W.2d at 197.
23. 414 So. 2d 1066.
24. Id. at 1068-69.
25. The authors shepardized Goller and found some interesting trends. The early
cases which followed Goller considered insurance availability as one argument in favor
of abrogating some parental immunity. See, e-g., Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, -,
199 N.W.2d 169, 172 (1972). Availability of insurance, however, was not the dominant
theme of these actions. By way of contrast, later cases limited liability to the extent of
liability insurance indicating the weight placed on the existence of insurance in deciding
parental negligence cases. See, e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 353, 339
N.E.2d 907, 909 (1975).
26. In studying the spread of intrafamilial liability from state to state, the authors
noted a time pattern. A positive correlation between passage of automobile no-fault
laws and abrogation of intrafamily immunity seems to exist. This observation lends
further support to the hypothesis of two-way causality. Publicity regarding the no-fault
legislation may well have reminded judges that insurance is available and ought to be
used. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980). This opinion al-
ludes to the importance of mandatory insurance in determining liability in automobile
accidents. In a footnote, the court stated: "The argument is made that heavy reliance
cannot be placed on homeowner's and renter's liability insurance because it is not re-
quired by statute, as is motor vehicle insurance." Id. at 600 n.7.
Massachusetts passed the first automobile no-fault law in 1971. The courts abro-
gated intrafamilial immunity in Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907. Florida
passed a no-fault law in 1972 and abrogated immunity in Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066
(Fla. 1982). New Jersey, Hawaii, Michigan and New York passed no-fault laws in
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C. Charitable Immunity
While intrafamilial immunity appears to have been a prod-
uct of the American judicial system, 27 charitable immunity
can be traced to the English case of Feoffees of Heriot's Hospi-
tal v. Ross.28 This case, and those to follow it, justified immu-
nity as a mechanism to protect a charity's trust funds.29
Payment to third party litigants was considered an improper
use of funds by grantors. 0 In the absence of immunity, it was
argued that grantors would decide to place their monies
elsewhere.31
The logic of immunity weakened as insurance became
widely available. The shift began in those cases where insur-
ance was known to exist. Courts used the rationale that where
insurance had been purchased, no diversion of trust funds
would occur by holding the charity liable. For instance, in
Wendt v. Servite Fathers,32 the court ruled:
If the absolute immunity enunciated in the Piper case were
to prevail, it would seem a sheer waste of money for a chari-
table corporation to purchase insurance protection. We hold
that where insurance exists and provides a fund from which
1973. Immunity was abrogated in France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267
A.2d 490 (1970); Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d
1007 (1969); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972); Nolechek v. Ger-
suale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340, 385 N.E.2d 1268 (1978). No-fault laws were
passed by the Kansas, Nevada and Pennsylvania legislatures in 1974. Immunity in
Kansas was abrogated in Nocktonik v. Nocktonik, 227 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980).
Nevada courts abrogated immunity in Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013
(1974). Pennsylvania courts did the same in Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351
(1971). Kentucky and Minnesota followed in 1975 with no-fault laws. They abrogated
immunity in Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971) and Anderson v.
Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980). Finally, no-fault became law in 1976 in North
Dakota. The courts there abrogated immunity in Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364
(N.D. 1967). This list of no-fault laws was taken from Landes, Insurance, Liability, and
Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents,
26 J. oF L. & ECON. 49 (1982).
27. See Thompson, Intrafamily Immunity: A Vanishing Myth?, 32 FED. INS.
COUNS. Q. 289 (1982).
28. 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846).
29. See, eg., Parks v. Northwestern Univ., 218 II. 381, _, 75 N.E. 991, 993
(1905).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N.E.2d 342 (1947).
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tort liability may be collected so as not to impair the trust
fund, the defense of immunity is not available.33
Courts deciding cases post-Wendt, however, recognized
the inherent disincentive to purchase insurance when liability
rested on the availability of insurance protection. Further,
they recognized that such a ruling "permits [charities] to de-
termine whether or not they will be liable."' 34  In response,
many courts ceased determination of liability on the amount
of insurance purchased. Instead, they considered the general
availability of insurance sufficient to abrogate immunity,
whether or not the defendant charity actually purchased
coverage.35
D. Sovereign Immunity
Justification for sovereign immunity followed somewhat
similar reasoning as that proffered in support of charitable im-
munity. "Thus it was said that the immunity of municipal
corporations was necessary in order to prevent the diversion
of public assets towards private gain. Willingness to abro-
gate sovereign or municipal immunity, however, appears to
have been more restrained than that demonstrated in abrogat-
ing intrafamily and charitable immunity.
Evidence of this restraint is the statutory foundation of
municipal liability and immunity.37 The amount of insurance,
which a municipality is permitted to purchase, is often statu-
33. Id. at 634, 76 N.E.2d at 349.
34. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, _, 211
N.E.2d 253, 260 (1965).
35. Id. See also Morehouse College v. Russell, 109 Ga. App. 301, 136 S.E.2d 179
(1964), in which the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a petition alleging negligence
against a charitable institution properly included reference to a policy of liability insur-
ance carried by the institution. However, recovery would be limited to noncharitable
income or assets. Id. at - 136 S.E.2d at 190-92.
36. C. GREGORY, H. KALVERN & R. EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 750.
37. The opinion of Bofyil v. State, 44 Mich. App. 118, 205 N.W.2d 222 (1972),
provides an example. The court cites Michigan cases establishing the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity in common law. These cases were overruled in 1943 with the enactment
of 1943 Mich. Pub. Acts 237, which "waived sovereign immunity from liability on the
part of the state in all actions." 44 Mich. App. at 126-27, 205 N.W.2d at 227. Two
years later, with the passage of 1945 Mich. Pub. Acts 87, sovereign immunity was rees-
tablished except with respect to the ownership or operation of a motor vehicle. Id. at
127. 205 N.W.2d at 227-28.
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torily determined. 38 Liability, in turn, may be statutorily lim-
ited to the amount of insurance the municipality may
purchase. Statutory insurance frameworks create peculiar
situations for municipalities. Municipalities consist of and ex-
ist for "the people." Thus, it is the people who decide the
responsibilities of municipalities through laws enacted by
elected officials. To sue a municipality beyond its statutorily
mandated responsibilities is in essence to sue its people. Thus,
a claim against the municipality is actually a claim against
oneself. This scenario closely parallels the historical under-
pinnings of interspousal immunity. As was true with the ab-
rogation of immunity between spouses, enactment of laws
played a part in the abrogation of sovereign immunity.' Yet,
while municipalities continue to enjoy some protection from
liability, the walls of protection have been weakened.
It has long been accepted that sovereign immunity pro-
tected only those activities imbued in governmental, as op-
posed to proprietary, functions.41 As a result, much of the
debate over municipal liability during the past 140 years has
focused on the delineation of governmental and proprietary
functions.42 However, in more recent days, readily available
insurance has been the basis of the argument for total abroga-
tion. For instance, in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
District No. 302,43the court stated that: "[i]f tax funds can
properly be spent to pay premiums on liability insurance,
38. See generally Annot., 71 A.L.R.3D 6 (1976).
39. See, e.g., 47 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 157.1 (West 1984), which authorizes
the purchase of liability insurance by various municipal organizations, and limits liabil-
ity to the maximum insurance the municipality may purchase.
40. See, e.g., Pajewski v. Perry, 363 A.2d 429 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976):
[I]n Delaware sovereign immunity is based on a Constitutional provision which
the Courts applied and criticized repeatedly before 1968. (And since then, as
well.) The Courts urged the Legislature to do what Justice Wolcott called "com-
mon justice" by a statute eliminating the doctrine and making the State answer
for its faults in a court of law. Against the back-ground, it seems clear to us that
the Insurance Act embodied in 18 Del. C. ch. 65 was the response made by the
General Assembly to the cases.
Id. at 435.
41. See, e.g., Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842).
42. See Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. Rnv.
437 (1941).
43. 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
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there seems to be no good reason why they cannot be spent to
pay the liability itself in the absence of insurance." 44
The relationship between municipal liability and the avail-
ability of insurance is difficult to ascertain. Often the extent of
liability is determined by the amount of insurance coverage
purchased.45 This is misleading, however, because the amount
of insurance purchased is often statutorily specified. The limit
of liability may also be statutorily specified so that it coincides
with insurance coverage.46
Yet, despite the problems encountered in clearly recogniz-
ing the two-way causality between municipal liability and in-
surance availability, arguments levied in support of liability
appear to follow insurance principles.47 That is, the ability to
spread costs and pool experience is an important factor in ab-
rogating sovereign immunity.4 8
The next section of this article will further consider the
argument of two-way causality and insurance principles by
describing their relevance in establishing liability of product
manufacturers and providers of medical care. The premise is
that while the mere availability of insurance may not be deter-
minative in establishing municipal liability, products liability,
and medical malpractice liability, the existence of insurance-
like circumstances is essential. The relevance of insurance-
like circumstances in products and medical malpractice cases
is presented below.
E. Products and Medical Malpractice Liability
Dean Prosser disagrees with the hypothesis of this re-
search. In his treatise on torts, he points to the many signifi-
44. Id. at 23, 163 N.E.2d at 95.
45. Jefferey v. Johnson, 23 Ohio Misc. 338, _, 260 N.E.2d 627, 638 (1970) (where
county hospital trustees purchase a liability policy, sovereign immunity is impliedly
waived to the extent of policy coverage).
46. "[Tlhe statutory plan . . . contemplates a waiver of immunity co-extensive
with the insurance program, which shall cover 'any type of risk to which the State may
be exposed'." Pajewski, 363 A.2d at 436 (citation omitted).
47. See, e.g., Molitor, 18 Ill. 2d at _ 163 N.E.2d at 95 ("The public's willingness
to stand up and pay the costs of its enterprises carried out through municipal corpora-
tions is no less than its insistence that individuals and groups pay the cost of their
enterprise.")
48. For further discussion of the characteristics of insurance, see infra text accom-
panying notes 58-74.
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cant products cases that have been decided in plaintiffs' favor
without direct reference to insurance.4 9 Prosser considers the
omission glaring as judges bolster their opinions with nearly
every conceivable justification to hold the manufacturer liable,
nearly every justification, that is, except for the availability of
insurance.
Prosser's point is well taken, but may be somewhat off tar-
get. Consider the language of Traynor's noted opinion in Es-
cola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,S° for instance:
[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever
it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is
evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards
and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public
cannot. . .. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person in-
jured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be in-
sured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public
as a cost of doing business.51
These words are essentially an exposition on the virtues of in-
surance. Even if Judge Traynor had omitted the word "in-
sured," the meaning would be equally as clear. The judge's
implication that the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards is the idea of predictability. Further, to suggest that
the manufacturer can "distribute among the public as a cost of
doing business" is to intimate the spreading concept of insur-
ance.2 Thus, Prosser's claim that insurance availability has
had little impact on broadening liability seems superficial.
These component parts of insurance, pooling and spreading,
may well have the same effect as the insurance product as a
whole.
Parallel arguments hold true for medical malpractice.
Even though liability in malpractice cases has not been ex-
pressly predicated on the availability of insurance, "insurance-
like circumstances" are available. The hospital has control
49. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 83, at 553-56 (4th ed.
1971).
50. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
51. Id. at -, 150 P.2d at 440-41.
52. For further discussion of these characterics, see infra text accompanying notes
60 to 72.
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over the risks of medical care, treats many patients so that
predictability of loss is fairly accurate, and is able to pass
along the costs of losses to the total group receiving services.
A complicating aspect of hospital or medical malpractice
is its relationship to charitable and sovereign immunity.
Many hospitals are owned and operated by charities or mu-
nicipalities. Thus, a patient-victim must circumvent tradi-
tional barriers of charitable and municipal immunity before
pursuing medical malpractice claims against hospitals. This
first obstacle has been lessened in recent years; by 1982, over
thirty jurisdictions had rejected immunity of charitable hospi-
tals. 3 The relevance of insurance to hospital or medical mal-
practice liability has been stated as follows:
[T]he courts generally express the view that there is no
valid reason why losses suffered by an individual through a
charitable hospital's wrongdoing should not be borne by all
society through insurance or similar loss distribution, thus
dismissing the notion that the charity's resources would be
depleted by imposing liability. 4
A more recent example of judicial reliance on insurance
principles appears in Helling v. Carey," in which the Wash-
ington Supreme Court ruled as follows:
In applying strict liability there are many situations
where it is imposed for conduct which can be defined with
sufficient precision to insure that application of a strict liabil-
ity principle will not produce miscarriages of justice in a sub-
stantial number of cases. If the activity involved is one
which can be defined with sufficient precision, that definition
can serve as an accounting unit to which the costs of the
activity may be allocated with some certainty and precision.
With this possible, strict liability serves a compensatory
function in situations where the defendant is, through the
use of insurance, the financially more responsible person. 6
53. 2 B. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 17.04 (1983).
54. Id. at 17.06, at 17-13. See also Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss.
906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951) (imposing full liability, the court emphasized the availability
of liability insurance, and the practice by many people of carrying hospital insurance,
thereby refuting the notion that funds would be diverted to other than charitable
purposes).
55. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (Cutter, A.J., concurring).
56. Id. at -, 519 P.2d at 984-85.
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Again, the reader should note the insurance principles embed-
ded in the opinion. Reference to an "accounting unit" brings
to mind the spreading concept; "allocated with some certainty
and precision" alludes to predictability.
III. IMPACT OF Two-WAY CAUSALITY
The preceding section of this paper outlined various areas
of law in which courts have considered the prevalence of in-
surance to be a significant factor in setting liability. The au-
thors opine that this two-way causality evolved from
perceived benefits of insurance. These perceived benefits arise
out of two important insurance principles: (1) through the
pooling of many similar exposures to loss, the predictability of
loss improves; and (2) through premiums, financial burdens
are spread among the masses exposed to loss rather than
borne solely by the few actually experiencing loss. 57 The first
principle is beneficial because predictability typically pro-
motes efficient planning of resource use.58  Benefits derive
from the second principle in that the resulting financial bur-
dens are tolerable to most, if not all, of those exposed to loss. 9
Considering the desirability of insurance, public policy natu-
rally gives preference to its use. Thus, where liability insur-
ance exists, one might argue that liability ought to apply.
Predictability and spreading each affect two-way causality.
To understand their effects, one should possess some knowl-
edge of the process by which each principle functions. The
following sections discuss these functions.
57. While many definitions of insurance exist, two consistently included elements
of these definitions are that "insurance is a method which reduces risk by a transfer and
combination (or 'pooling') of uncertainty in regard to financial loss." See generally D.
BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 27 (10th ed. 1979) (emphasis in original).
58. Consider preparation for trial. The legal representative who knows the case in
minute detail, has had previous experience with the judge, and knows the trial pattern
of the opposing lawyer can better plan a course of action than if some or all of these
elements were absent. Similarly, the insurer who has predictive information is better
able to pinpoint premium requirements for its future obligations and use those premi-
ums more efficiently than is one without such information.
59. Although most consumers complain of outrageously high insurance premiums,
an annual charge of $500 (or whatever one must pay) is likely affordable. The $50,000
(or whatever amount of coverage exists) against which the insurance provides protec-
tion would pose a troublesome burden to most drivers. Thus, all insureds pay afforda-
ble premiums (losses) to avoid catastrophic responsibilities.
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A. Predictability
First, consider predictability. Insurance is based on a sta-
tistical relationship termed the law of large numbers.' Basi-
cally, this law holds that as the number of units in a group
increases, the predictability of outcomes to that group im-
proves. Insurers group the experience of a large number of
policy holders, improving the predictability for the whole over
the sum of the individual estimates.61
Use of the law of large numbers for insurance predictions
is predicated on certain assumptions. First, the information
used to estimate outcomes must be representative of the pe-
riod of prediction. Second, exposures 61 must be independent
and homogeneous. 63 Third, outcomes must be random, fortu-
itous or accidental. 64
60. See generally M. GREENE & 0. SERBEIN, RISK MANAGEMENT: TEXT AND
CASES (2nd ed. 1983). "The law of large numbers, stated nontechnically, says that as
the number of events increases, the variation in the proportion of actual outcomes from
expected out-comes tends to decrease constantly and approaches zero." Id. at 25-26
(emphasis in original).
61. For example, consider 1,000 realtors, all of whom own 1,000 homes. Assume
each has the same probability of loss, one home. Also assume that the probability of
loss to each home is unaffected by loss to any of the other homes. If each realtor exper-
iences one loss, except for one of the realtors who has two, that unlucky realtor had an
increased loss of 100%. If, instead, the realtors agreed to share each other's losses, the
group would experience 1,001 losses, or an increase of only 1% over their expectation.
Thus, the group's risk is less than that of the sum of the individuals.
This same argument can be made more formally. Assume a binomial distribution.
The probability of loss, "p" is .001; the probability of no loss, "q" is .999; and, the
number of units, "n" is 1,000 to each of the 1,000 realtors. Then:
X =mean loss =p . n =.001(1,000) = 1
s = standard deviation = (p . q. n) 1/ 2 = [(.001)(.999)(1,000)]1/2 = 1
CV = coefficient of variation = risk = s/X = 1/1 = I
If the realtors group their experience, n = 1,000,000
X = .001(1,000,000) = 1,000
s - [(.001)(.999)(1,000,000)]1/2 = 31.61
CV = 31.61/1,000 = .03161
Thus, risk is reduced because the coefficient of variation is lower for the group than for
each individual realtor.
62. An exposure is an opportunity for loss, such as ownership of a home, boat, etc.
Insurance protects a policyholder against such a loss. Liability insurance, specifically,
protects against the loss of financial assets because of responsibility for harm caused
someone else.
63. See generally R. HOLTOM, UNDERWRITING: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
137-68 (1973).
64. See generally id. at 96; J. ATHEARN & S. T. PRITCHETT, RISK AND INSURANCE
96 (5th ed. 1984).
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Two-way causality makes the existence of these character-
istics questionable. First, most insurers rely on past loss expe-
rience to predict future losses. As courts shift the basis of
liability, experience fails to be indicative of future losses. In-
surers are forced to rely on subjective guesses regarding legal
rulings rather than objective statistical information. The result
is less quantifiable precision and planning.6
Second, as courts abrogate immunity, the probability of
liability to any previously immune party is increased. The
abrogation does not only apply to the defendant in a particu-
lar case. For example, liability imposed on one municipality
increases the probability of liability on the part of all others.
Two-way causality in this way eliminates some degree of inde-
pendence among exposure units.6
Likewise, two-way causality may render some loss of ran-
domness in outcome. A random event is one that is unknown,
but which is determined by a probability distribution.6 7 In in-
surance terminology, "random" indicates an event unaffected
and uncontrolled by the policyholder. If one considers two-
way causality, however, the policyholder can affect whether
liability will result, regardless of whether the underlying event
is controlled or affected in any way. Insurance will not affect
the happening of a loss; it affects who pays for the loss. 6 8
In sum, two-way causality weakens the application of the
law of large numbers for predictability of insured losses. As
predictability worsens, insurers are forced to raise premiums
to cover potential loss volatility. Insurers thus fail in their
risk-reducing function.
65. In essence, insurers guess what the legal environment will be in the covered
period. Judgmental estimates do not quantify underlying probabilities, such as an esti-
mate of the next appearance of Halley's comet. As a result, precision is impossible.
66. Independence is fairly easy to understand in a property insurance example.
Property insurers avoid selling coverage concentrated in a single geographical area.
They do so to reduce the probability of one event causing harm to a majority of policy-
holders. Thus, while the probability of loss to a house is increased if a neighboring
house is on fire, a house located 1,000 miles away is independent of the event. The
probability of loss to this third house is unaffected by the ensuing fire.
67. See generally E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE (1976).
68. If liability is determined by the existence of insurance, the parties involved de-
termine their liability by deciding whether to buy insurance and for how much. See,
e.g., supra, text accompanying note 34.
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B. Spreading
Once predictability is adversely affected, the losses to be
spread are increased. The increase derives from two sources.
First, an additional risk charge is required to cover the lack of
predictability. 69 Second, losses and expenses are greater, re-
quiring larger intake per policyholder for payment. If the in-
crease is substantial, premiums may become unaffordable.7 ° If
premiums are unaffordable, coverage will not be purchased.71
If insurance is not purchased, the rationale for considering in-
surance availability in determining liability in the first place is
eliminated. Thus, those exposed to loss find themselves back
where they began, but now must respond to increased liability
without insurance.72
C. Additional Effects
In addition, consider the result when liability is limited to
the amount of insurance held by the defendant. A rational
person would decide against purchasing insurance under such
a rule. Hence, coverage would likely be required. In a sense, a
program of mandatory insurance, coupled with broader defi-
nitions of liability that benefit injured persons, is a program of
socialized medicine. Unlike a direct socialized medicine pro-
69. An estimated loss value has a probability of precise accuracy near zero; insurers
determine a range in which losses are expected to fall. In order to pay for the losses that
fall above the estimate, insurers add a "risk charge" to premiums. The less predictable
an outcome, the larger is the range of expected losses, requiring a higher risk charge.
70. Insurance scholars generally consider premiums to be "unaffordable" when
they represent a high percentage of the limit of liability. See, e.g., R. MEHR & E. CAM-
MACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 75 (6th ed. 1976).
71. Insurance scholars tie the problem of unaffordable premiums to adverse selec-
tion. Adverse selection occurs when "people who obtain insurance tend to be those who
need it most - those with greater probability of loss than the average." G. REJDA,
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 28 (1982). As insurance premiums represent higher and
higher percentages of protection provided, the people willing to pay the premiums are
those who need insurance the most. Adverse selection, in turn, forces insurers to raise
premiums, and the cycle continues.
72. For example, consider the conclusion of a 1976 Special Committee on Public
Liability, formed by the Wisconsin Legislature to study the status of municipal liability
in the state: "The conclusions of the committee were that local government units' im-
munity to liability was disappearing, liability insurance was either difficult to purchase
or was available only at a high cost .. " OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INSUR-
ANCE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE AVAILABILITY AND COST OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
COVERAGE FOR WISCONSIN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, at 2 (1979) (by Susan Mitchell,
Commissioner of Insurance).
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gram, however, liability involves waste in assigning responsi-
bility and determining benefits. The waste associated with
liability is the cost of litigation. Proceeds from liability premi-
ums in large part provide for litigation costs rather than com-
pensation for loss. This fact has been a key argument used by
proponents of no-fault automobile insurance plans.73
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
'The hypothesis of this research is that liability determina-
tion and insurance availability are dependent in a relationship
of two-way causality. Section II of this piece illustrates vari-
ous circumstances in which liability was based, in part, on the
existence of insurance, or insurance-like, protection. The de-
mand for, and hence existence of, insurance protection is in
turn increased by the determination of liability.
The authors intend, however, for the contribution of this
research to stem from Section III. In Section III, the circular,
and ultimately detrimental, reasoning that results in two-way
causality is demonstrated. One not well versed in the underly-
ing principles of insurance would easily miss the problems of
circularity.
A conclusion that could be drawn from this research is
that insufficient understanding of insurance, and its legitimate
purposes, exists on the part of lawyers, judges, and consumers.
In order to remedy this problem, perhaps law students should
be required to take a course in law and economics. Such ac-
tion should be taken by all law schools.
A second conclusion is that the entire tort system requires
critical scrutiny. Due to the extent of liability exposure, the
size of the tort system may be unmanageable. A practical re-
sponse may be to undertake a major overhaul of the current
tort system.74 Passage of workers' compensation acts early in
this century exemplifies precedence for such a radical
response.
73. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND
THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND
TO THE PRESIDENT (1971).
74. See 13 J.LEGAL STUD. (1984). The entire volume is devoted to catastrophic
personal injuries. It is derived from a conference sponsored by The Hoover Institution.
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Finally, the authors suggest some effort be made to edu-
cate the general public about the meaning of "liability." A
consumer who understands when and why a producer will be
held liable for some event will be a more efficient actor in the
marketplace. Discord and waste through misperception can
be reduced when information is provided.
